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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LICENSING AND REGULATING TAXICABS IS AN EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER
AND MUST BEAR A REASONABLE RELATION TO THE
PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY, MORALS OR WELFARE TO BE
VALID. Thus in the recent owner-driver taxicab case of City and
County of Denver v. Thrailkill,' both the individual and corporate
plaintiffs had brought an action for declaratory judgment asking
that the court define and determine the right, duties and status of
all parties in the light of an amended ordinance claimed to be invalid and unconstitutional and further requesting an injunction to
prevent the enforcement of the ordinance.
The owner-driver system of taxicab operations is one where
the taxicabs are owned by private individuals rather than by a
company, and the company obtains a master license and allows the
individual to use the company name, advertising facilities and
garage repairs in return for a flat fee. Prior to amendment the
owner-driver system was recognized by city council 2 by passing a
licensing and regulatory measure which covered this type of operation as well as company owned cabs and by the Colorado Supreme
CourtA The original ordinance provided for the issuance of master
licenses, licenses to drivers of taxicabs, revocation and renewal of
licenses and certain reasonable and necessary restrictions upon the
use of taxicabs within the city; all within the power of city council
to subject the operation of taxicabs to reasonable regulation in the
exercise of the police power. The power of municipalities, under
state law, to4 regulate the use of public streets in the interests of all
is conceded.
In 1950 city council amended Section 4 of the 1947 ordinance
by adopting ordinance 53 which prohibited the sale, transfer or
assignment of any master license and vested in the manager of
Safety and Excise the authority to renew licenses. In holding this
portion of the amended act constitutional, although the trial court
held contra, it was determined that the grant of a privilege to enter
a business is a personal and not a property right in the constitutional sense.5
There is a distinction between the delegation of power
to make a law and conferring authority or discretion in
its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
......Colo ..... 244 P. 2d 1074 (1952).
Ordinance 165, Series of 1947.
International Brotherhood v. Publix Cab Company, 119 Colo. 208, 202 P.
2d 154 (1949).
'35 Colo. Stat. Ann., ch. 163, sec. 10, par. 7.
'Allen v. City of Kosciusko, 207 Miss. 343, 42 S. 2d 388 (1949).
2
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objection can be made.6
A statute that attempts to vest arbitrary discretion
and unlimited power with respect to lawful business,
without providing uniform rules and regulations, so that
the officials as well as those affected thereby
may govern
7
themselves accordingly, is unconstitutional.
By ordinance 109, Series of 1950, the city council purported
to prohibit the owner-driver system by amending section 15 of the
1947 ordinance to provide that:
No person shall drive or be permitted to drive a taxicab on the streets of the City and County of Denver for
business purposes unless such person is a licensed driver
who either is an operator or an employee of an operator
who is paid a fixed definite wage and/or a fixed commission based on the gross amount of fares received from
passengers. The Master License of any operator who shall
violate this Section may in the discretion of the Manager
be revoked or suspended in whole or in part as provided
in Section 6 hereof.
Further changes in section 18 which tended to show the intent
of the city council stated:
No taxicab license shall be granted to any operator
unless such operator is the bona fide, beneficial owner of
the taxicab ....
No taxicab license shall be issued to any
operator where such taxicab is to be hired, leased, rented,
or made the subject of a rental and purchase arrangement
to or with any driver thereof.
The question before the court was whether the passage of an
ordinance was within the authority of a municipality, in the exercise of the police power or otherwise, which abolished the ownerdriver system of taxicab operation by prohibiting the issuance of a
license to any applicant except the bona fide beneficial owner of the
taxicab and required the payment of a fixed wage or commission
based on the gross amount of fares received from passengers.
The defendant contended that the right of the city council to
control the use of the streets of the city by private persons for
private gain is plenary." No prior Colorado law having existed on
this point, the Court proceeded to set forth the rule for this jurisdiction to the effect that there is no authority in a municipality to
prohibit the use of the city streets by any citizen or corporation in
the carrying on of a legitimate business, harmless in itself and
useful to the community, which is independent of the police power
under which reasonable regulations may in the promotion of the

ILocke's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491, 13 Ann. Rep. 716; Smith-Brooks Printing
Co. v. Young, 103 Colo. 199, 85 P. 2d 39 (1938).
1People v. Stanley, 90 Colo. 315, 9 P. 2d 288 (1932); People v. Harris, 104
Colo. 386, 91 P. 2d 989 (1939) ; Trujillo v. Walsenburg, 108 Colo. 427, 118 P.
2d 108 (1942).

'Atlantic Veterans Transportation, Inc. v. Jenkins, 203 Ga. 457, 47 S. E. 2d
324 (1948).
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public order, safety, health and welfare be proper.9 The test, therefore, is whether such regulation is reasonable and a proper exercise
of the police power. lO
The Court having dispensed with the rather unusual argument
of a city having plenary power, went on to consider whether Ordinance 109 was a valid exercise of the police power. As far back
as 1910, in the decision of City and County of Denver v. Curran,"
in which the city had passed an ordinance with regard to advertising billboards, the Court held that a municipal ordinance authorized by specific and definite legislative enactment, and not conflicting with any constitutional provision, will be sustained; but an
ordinance which a municipality assumes to pass under a general
grant of authority, or under incidental powers, must be reasonable,
fair and impartial, and not arbitrary or oppressive. In arriving at
such decision the Court stated:
It appears that the ordinance here under consideration has no real or substantial relation to the protection of
the public health, the public morals, or the public safety,
and imposes an unnecessary and unreasonable restriction
upon the use of private property; it commits, in some instances, the exercise of the municipality's legislative discretion to property owners and residents and in others,
entrusts such power to the caprice of certain of its officers,
and vests in them an absolute or despotic power to grant,
refuse or revoke the right to carry on an ordinary, legitimate business.
As later stated in Sapero v. State Board of Medical Examiners :12
To be valid, such legislation must bear a fair relation
to the public health, safety, morals or welfare and tend
to promote or protect the same.
The business of operating taxicabs is a property right and as
such is entitled to protection against municipal action, the effect
of which would be to deprive taxicab owners of their property without due process of law. The Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld a somewhat similar ordinance in Victory Cab Co. v. Shaw. 13
However, that case is distinguishable in that the taxicabs were
owned by the company which obtained a franchise from the city
and then "farmed" them out to individual drivers, where in the
instant case the taxicabs were not owned by the companies to
which master licenses were issued. The Colorado Supreme Court
125 Amer. Juris., p. 544, sec. 253; 37 Amer. Juris., p. 533, sec. 19.
10Chenoweth v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Colo. 74, 141 P. 132
(1914); Antlers Association v. Hartung, 85 Colo. 125, 274 P. 831 (1928) ; State
Board of Dental Examiners v. Savelle, 90 Colo. 177, 8 P. 2d 693 (1932) ; Sapero
v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 90 Colo. 568, 11 P. 2d 555 (1932) ; Lipset
v. Davis, 119 Colo. 335, 203 P. 2d 730 (1949).
1 47 Colo. 221, 107 P. 261 (1910).
12Supra.

13232 N. C. 138, 59 S. E. 2d 573 (1950).
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rejected the argument used in that case choosing to follow instead
the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Liggett Co. v.
Baldridge 14 holding invalid an ordinance requiring that every
pharmacy or drug store shall be owned only by a licensed pharmacist, because there was no relationship between mere ownership
of a drug store and the public health. So too the mere ownership
of a taxicab has no reasonable relation to the public health. Since
the amended portions of the ordinance are inseparably related, and
the main object of the ordinance-the destruction of the ownerdriver system is invalid, the other amendments cannot be sustained.
In the opinion of this writer, the Colorado Supreme Court has
once more indicated that regulations issued in pursuance of the
police power must be reasonable and must bear a reasonable relationship to the public health, welfare, safety or morals of the community to be valid.
R. KEYES.
-GERALDINE

EXPENSES OF MOVING IN EMINENT
DOMAIN CASES
FRED CALHOUN*

If land is condemned for public use by eminent domain, the
problem arises as to which party will bear the expense of moving
a building to another location. This particular question has not
been the cause of litigation in Colorado and has been settled in
but a few cases in the United States.
There is one good reason why this is true. State constitutions'
and statutes 2 establish a procedure to follow in condemnation proceedings. If these laws are faithfully followed, it is almost impossible to have "moving compensation" a question for the court
to decide. The Colorado statute, 3 which sets out the facts that a
jury or commissioners are to report, makes it mandatory to consider the values of a building for compensation purposes, whether
the building is to be removed or left on the property condemned.
However, before an owner is entitled to remove a building
from land that has been condemned, he must first reserve such
right in the preliminary proceedings. 4 It is also true that the
condemner can neither make the owner take the building 5 nor
deduct
remove the building to other property of the owner and
the value of the building from the damages to be paid. 6
'278 U. S. 105, 49 S. Ct. 57 (1928).
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
'Colorado Constitution, Art. II, sec. 15.
2'35 C.S.A., Ch. 61.
sec. 18.
'IIbid.,
4
Corpus Juris, Eminent Domain, sec. 249. Lineburg v. Sandven et al, 21
N.W. 2d 808 (1946).
'Cumbaa v. Town of Geneva, 235 Ala. 423, 179 So. 277 (1938).
EState v. Miller, 92 S.W. 2d 1073 (1936).
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If, in spite of these precautions and obstacles, the question
must be litigated, the status of the owner of the building will
determine which one of two possible courses the owner should
pursue to recover damages. The theory of a tenant recovering
for removal is entirely different from the theory used to determine
damages when the owner of the building is also the owner of the
land.
In order for a tenant to receive damages, his rights as a tenant
must include some right to the building in question. This right
may arise from an agreement that the tenant may remove buildings at the end of his tenancy, from an agreement that the landowner will buy the buildings constructed by the tenant during
the tenancy, or even be a right arising after eminent domain proceedings have started, where the owner does not want the building
and the condemner does not have any use for it, but the lessee
elects to remove the same.
If the latter is the case, indications seem to be that the
amount of damages paid by the condemner should be lessened by
the fair market value of the building as it stood on the land, such
amount to be diminished by the cost of immediate removal because of necessity. This is a nice formula to determine the condemner's liability, but it leaves the owner of the building in the
position of losing property without compensation. In actual practice, however, the building is probably worthless to the owner or
the tenant has made arrangements with the owner so that the
building will be paid for in one form or another.
If the tenant has such rights as may permit him to remove
the building, three formulae have been developed to determine
damages. First, the damages are awarded as the cost of immediate removal. Second, the cost of removal is determined to be no
more than it would have been at the end of the tenancy for the
reason that the tenant would have to remove at that time and is
entitled to no compensation for moving now. Third, the tenant is
entitled to damages equal to the cost of immediately moving the
building, such amount to be lessened by the cost of removal at
the end of the term. The last method appears to be more fair to
both the tenant and the condemner and a majority of the courts
use this measurement. The first and second methods have both
been used but rarely.
Now, if the owner of the land wants to remove a building,
and all preliminary steps have been taken, the courts will allow
damages for removal. In this case two formulae have been developed. First, the amount will be the value of the land taken,
including the building, less the fair market value of the building,
such deduction to be lessened by the cost of moving. Second, the
amount will be the value of the land taken, including the building,
diminished by an amount equal to the difference in fair market
value of the building as it stood on the old location and as it
stands on the new location.
A close study of the two methods will show a discrepancy.
There are advantages under either method, but there are also
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disadvantages. The amount of recovery for moving one building
may vary greatly according to the theory used, but there can be
one situation where the recovery would be the same. To best illustrate this possibility, it may be well to turn to algebra. Letting D
equal damages, V as value, c as cost of removal, x as fair market
value on the condemned land, and y as fair market value in the
new location, we derive the following equations:
1-D equals V - (x - c)
2-D equals V - (x - y)
If at any time the cost of removal in the first method is equal
to the loss in fair market value in the second method, the recovery
will be identical.
A perplexing problem involved in the first method, in which
the cost of moving is allowed, is how far can the owner move the
building and what methods can he employ? Surely a mover could
not relocate the building two or three counties away and expect
moving expenses to be paid, nor could the condemner reasonably
expect the owner to move just across the property line unless
there were other controlling factors. Reasonableness is the answer. The owner should be allowed to move the building to a
new location, such location and cost of moving thereto to be within
reason.
The second theory has a disadvantage, even if the building
is moved only a reasonable distance. Suppose the building to
be moved has qualities which make it peculiarly suitable for a
certain use. By moving the building to another location where it
can be used for the same purposes, it is entirely possible that the
fair market value would be the same as before. Must the owner
then pay the moving costs? We can carry this example further. Let
us assume the new value far exceeds the old value. In this case
the owner is better off in that he has theoretically been compensated
for the cost of moving by the increase in valuation.
Another assumption, to bring out a point. Suppose the owner
of this building moves it to a location where the value of the
building, because of its restricted use, is nil. After settlement, is
he to be allowed to move the building to the location where the
value exceeds that of the original location? Can this not be termed
double collection?
Here, again, it seems that reasonableness is a requisite, not
only from the owner's point of view, but also from that of the
condemner's. The basic theory behind this method is to allow
the owner the cost of moving, and neither the owner nor the condemner should try to take too great an advantage lest the court
lean towards the other method.
With this reasoning and comparison of both methods, one
may draw the conclusion that there is no great difference in damages allowed in either case, especially when reasonableness is considered. With no reported case authority in Colorado, it may be
predicted that our court will probably strike a method which will
include one of the above, to be limited so that both the owner and
the condemner will have a fair assessment of damages.
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